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Irrigation, Livelihoods and River Basins
by 
Bruce Lankford
Summary
This paper examines the relationship between irrigation, rural livelihoods and river
basin management in Tanzania.  There are six critical arguments contained in this
paper. Firstly, irrigation is a complex livelihood activity that many integrates across
many economic, natural, technical and social systems; farmers implicitly understand
this, adjusting the extent of their involvement in irrigation, and therefore only in
special circumstances do governments need to 'provide irrigation' or to further
increase it.  Second, irrigation is a sector that consumes considerable amounts of
water and may impact negatively on downstream sectors and livelihoods; pastoralists,
rainfed agriculturalists, the environment and urban demands, especially during the
dry season.  Third, irrigation does not reduce poverty in a geographically widespread
fashion; this is because water is limited, sites for irrigation are restricted and places
for irrigators finite.  Fourth, a functioning irrigation system depends on the resolution
of its own particular problems not on the application of generic irrigation theory.
Fifth, irrigation improvements are often associated with technological interventions;
these are prone to be poorly designed and expensive resulting in increased
‘maldistribution’ of water and therefore conflict.  Sixth, in most cases the water
resource is sufficiently limited in time and quantity for it to be contested over.  In these
cases policy should focus not necessarily on irrigation improvement, but on conflict
mediation.  This too reminds us of the need to take a balanced livelihoods river-basin
approach and to establish appropriate institutional frameworks.
Introduction 
This paper examines irrigation policy in Tanzania utilising a livelihoods and river basin
perspective.  It first analyses the current tone of development-thinking regarding irrigation
and suggests that this is mainly predicated on the benefits of irrigation with little recognition
of the costs and complexities of irrigation.  The paper reveals how policy interventions for
irrigation support are often flawed.  The discussion explores livelihoods access to irrigation,
including the subject of livelihoods diversification alongside irrigation.  It does not, however,
reformulate the rural livelihoods (RL) framework (Ellis, 2000; Carney 1998) to incorporate
irrigation, even though the latter has conditions and processes that suggest an alternative RL
construct.  Finally, it goes onto propose several ways in which policy-makers might support
irrigated agriculture in Tanzania.
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The context of irrigation development in Tanzania
The Tanzanian agricultural sector, in official statistics, forms the greatest share of GDP;
49.1% in 1998, and 56% in 2000.  It absorbs 84% of the employed population of the 32
million Tanzanians (Tanzanian Government Statistics, 2001; JICA, 2001).  Although
different strategies are being suggested to raise agricultural incomes, recently, the
Government has placed particular emphasis on the development of irrigation.  Related to
national interests, there has been a recent resurgence of donor interest in irrigation in Sub-
Saharan Africa as an engine of rural development and food security as evidenced by
increased activity of regional institutions working in these fields; (e.g. SWIMNET, SACCAR
and IWMI) and renewed donor support of irrigation, (e.g. from DANIDA, JICA, AfDB, and
DFID).  
In Tanzania policy documents, irrigation is addressed in the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Process paper (PRSP), the Agricultural Strategy Paper (ASP) and the Rural Development
Strategy Paper (RDSP).  These documents give the perception that the Government should
take a leading and interventionist role in irrigation development, as demonstrated by the
following quotes from a variety of strategy documents:
“Among factors that contribute to risk in Tanzania's agriculture is the
unpredictability of rainfall and the recurrence of drought and floods.  Soil and
water management practices must be improved in order to reduce these risks and
improve the productivity and profitability of agriculture.”  
"comprehensive land use maps with district-by-district details" will be prepared so
that "zones with cropping and grazing potential are identified”.
"a comprehensive programme for integrating soil and water conservation,
rainwater harvesting and storage, irrigation and drainage will be developed by
MAFS and MWLD".  It will pay particular attention to ensuring long-term
sustainability of water resources and making agriculture a competitive user of
water in comparison with other sectors.  The government will facilitate the
programme's implementation by farmers through providing technical advice on
these issues.”
"Promotion and support of small-scale irrigation will be given particular
emphasis.  This support will be based on cost benefit assessments and the
willingness of farmers to contribute to proposed investments."
Connected to these interests is the related argument that potential exists for irrigation in
Tanzania.  MWLD (2001) states that only 15 per cent (6.3 million ha) of all suitable land is
used for agriculture, and only a fraction of that is used for irrigation.  Kalinga et al (2000)
states the position:
“the irrigation potential could be far above the estimated 1 million ha if surface
and groundwater resources are combined [of which] only 15% is developed.  So
while we have the responsibility to make sure that the 15% area …is operated and
maintained.., we are even more indebted to make sure the remaining 85% is
developed sustainably..” (page 6)
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Schultz (2001) echoes this narrative on realising potential in a recent paper on scope for
irrigation in Southern and Eastern Africa. 
The mechanisms by which this potential will be developed are outlined in the National
Irrigation Development Plan, which was prepared in 1994 to stabilise and increase food
production.  The NIDP of 1994 can be summarised into three priorities (quoted in ASPS
2000, JICA 2001 and Kalinga et al 2001):
1. Rehabilitation or upgrading of traditional irrigation schemes (156 of them).
2. Upgrading water harvesting technology where irrigation is not possible.
3. Develop new smallholder schemes, where demand exists and conditions are
appropriate
Although these remain, donor emphasis has mainly switched to priority numbers one and
two.  Thus in 2001, JICA was asked to formulate a National Irrigation Master Plan (NIMP),
for Tanzania.  The objectives of the NIMP are rather unclear and circular, however they
appear to be a review of existing policies with the intention of expressing lessons learnt in
order to establishing new methods of delivering irrigation development.  The principles of the
latter are also unclear but emphasises ‘software’ rather than ‘hardware’.  In other words, the
NIMP realises that farmers need to 'own' irrigation schemes – and that this will be achieved
through MAFS training of participants.  This is an interesting ‘top-down’ viewpoint that
argues that farmers have to be trained to own irrigation schemes.  Similarly, 
“Thinking about non-performing irrigators especially those who have received
assistance in the past and now their irrigation schemes are either abandoned or
running inefficiently, one could imagine of having a law that would govern
irrigation development in this country.  Farmers should be responsible for the
support and assistance they receive from their Government.” (Kalinga et al, 2001;
23) 
Yet in contrast, balancing the interventionist stance described above, the Government
understands the limits of its reach.  This is also demonstrated in the ASP and NIDP;
"there is a need to define what Government, at central and local level, can and
cannot do versus the role of the private sector in agricultural development".
(ASP)
"increased private sector participation and agricultural development in general
requires the creation of a favourable climate for commercial activities" (which
goes on to address tax regimes and incentives). (ASP)
Therefore, as indicated in the updated NIDP (Kalinga et al, 2001) government emphasis
allows private sector involvement in irrigation, either privatising the existing irrigated state
(NAFCO) farms or in the construction of new irrigation:
“With regard to any future proposed irrigation development for large-scale or
medium scale irrigation systems, the Government should create a conducive
environment for the private sector to establish these developments on a
commercial basis” (page 12)
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Although it may be viable and contribute to national food security targets, commercial private
irrigation is not within the remit of this paper, which tackles the risks, benefits and costs
associated with smallholder irrigation.  
Implicit in these narratives are two main thrusts to irrigation development in Tanzania; one is
emphasis on irrigation expansion and one is on irrigation rehabilitation and improvement
(many in Tanzania hold that traditional surface irrigation in Tanzania is inefficient; figures of
15 per cent are widely quoted (MWLD, 2001; Masija, 2001)).  Yet because of the high costs
and relatively little performance gain associated with recent rehabilitation efforts, some
lessons are being learnt.  This demonstrated in the new emphasis on ‘software’ in JICA’s
National Irrigation Master Plan.  
Even so, there is general consensus that irrigation is automatically beneficial, that it needs
'fixing' and but for the removal of a few constraints it would grow to meet its potential.
However, as will be seen in this analysis, irrigation is contrary and complex, and an approach
to irrigation requires both a livelihoods and river basin perspective.  Irrigation policy has to
deal with a set of dilemmas.  On the one hand irrigation requires government policy and
support, and on other, irrigation is only effected, controlled and improved by farmers.  How
can irrigation 'facilitation' can be formulated in ways that is pro-poor rather than pro-
commercial farming; that does not waste resources; that assists but does not undermine the
farmers; that encourages ‘ownership’ but does not force it; that uses available water but does
not promote overuse and exacerbate conflict?  A balanced methodology is needed for
irrigation support – something that ASPS (2000) argues for.  
Research methods
The discussion is supported by data collected in the Morogoro region of Tanzania.  Three out
of six sub-villages in the village of Chanzuru were sampled; Kati, Darajani and Chekereni,
although visits were paid to all the villages.  Chanzuru is found on the road between Kilosa
and the junction on the main Dar to Iringa road.   The village lays claim to the Chanzuru
Irrigation System, which is typical of Tanzanian systems in that it taps river water running off
an escarpment onto a plain before it spreads into pools and swamps or supplies other rivers
that drain this plain.  Equally typical is that Chanzuru is one of a sequence of intakes on the
Ilonga River.  More importantly, the Chanzuru irrigation system is downstream of an
improved intake that supplies the Ilonga Irrigation System that belongs to a neighbouring
village.   Figure 1 shows the river system in schematic detail.  The area is also representative
of the debate on irrigation potential; 3 per cent of Morogoro rivers are used for irrigation
(DANIDA/JICA, 2001).
Sampling followed a similar format in each sub-village and is described in more detail in
Ellis and Mdoe (2002).  PRA wealth-ranking identified three wealth groups that were then
sub-sampled using a stratified random technique giving rise to 10 households in the middle
and richer households and 15 households in the poorest group.  Alongside qualitative and
quantitative surveys general PRA exercises and more focussed irrigation interviews were
conducted1.
                                                     
1 The analysis is also supported by the author’s experience gained while working in the last
three years in the Usangu Plains, Tanzania on two DFID projects “Sustainable Management
of the Usangu Wetlands and its Catchments” (SMUWC) and “Raising Irrigation
Productivity and Releasing Water for Intersectoral Needs” (RIPARWIN).
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Figure 1. Schematic map of the four intakes of River Ilonga
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- irrigation raises the number of jobs conducted on the land (e.g. irrigating, weeding) and
therefore employment opportunities;
- irrigation raises the landesque capital of irrigated land, attracting commerce related to
land such as renting of plots (clearly visible from increasing rents year on year, which
now stand at 20-30 000 Tsh/acre).
In addition, a variety of knock-on effects of these benefits can be identified.  In Chanzuru,
farmers who had been irrigating at subsistence level recently chose to irrigate 'for the market',
growing and selling whole-stick sugarcane and tomatoes.  Here, irrigation provided the
platform and exposure to home-level entrepreneurship.  Some farmers bought produce from
others to sell.  As the size of irrigation increases, so do the number of people, and importantly
the number of economic transactions between active irrigating farmers, labourers,
landowners, service providers and surrounding householders.
Many studies support this picture of success from irrigation.  DFID (1997), Shah (2000) and
Van Koppen, (1998) found that irrigation generated extra cash and jobs in the wider
economy.  Studies in Zimbabwe (CEH/IOH, date unknown) found that groundwater use in
dryland areas brought considerable livelihood benefits to those villages with access to the
wells.  Schulz (2001) argues that food security at the national and international level is
dependent these days on the contribution of irrigation.  Chambers wrote cogently in 1988,
that benefits of irrigation-based livelihoods occurred at household, regional and national
levels.
Yet despite these clear advantages, irrigation has what might be described as 'honey-pot'
attractions.   Policy-makers are lured to a notionally attractive intervention which, when
scaled up in size has trap-like qualities; becoming more glutinous, intractable and risk-prone.
Thus, the main message of research of the last 20-30 years has also highlighted the
transaction costs, institutional problems, low economic return and environmental impacts of
irrigation (c.f.  Bottrall, 1985; Chambers, 1988; Postel, 1992; Mazungu, 2000). The next
section explores how irrigation systems at the larger scale become more complex.
The complexities and costs of irrigation
This paper skirts the notion that all surface irrigation systems over (say) 50 ha are intractable,
complex and subject to livelihood risks.  On the contrary, each irrigation system should be
treated as being specific, individual and containing important ‘stories of success’.
Nonetheless, medium- and large-scale systems acquire scalar-related characteristics that
make large irrigation analysis and intervention markedly more complex – this relationship is
captured in Table 1.  Note too, small-scale systems increase in complexity when they
conglomerate into a connected patchwork of systems fed by one river or one aquifer.  Thus in
Usangu in Tanzania, it is the total area of many small systems that has lead to problems
associated with water shortage (SMUWC, 2001).  Although understanding these complexities
is a prelude to taking appropriate initiatives, there is space only to give an abridged
explanation.  
Central to understanding irrigation is the fact that irrigation is four things; a sector consuming
water; an input to crop production; a system in its own right; and a human activity.  These are
discussed below.
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The reason irrigation (or water resources) becomes complex is because water connects inter-
dependent users as it flows through natural and built environments.  Irrigation as a sector is
especially important because water is consumed rather than used; water evaporates and is lost
from the surface hydrological system.  When water passes through a river basin, its
consumption in irrigation subtracts from its use in another areas and sectors.   The quantities
consumed by irrigation are considerable.  This contrasts with other sectors that use and
recycle water, or use smaller amounts of water.  The fact that irrigation sits within a multi-
sectoral, water-short environment is often omitted from planning that seeks to maximise
development of ‘irrigation potential’ without recognising other sectors and livelihoods.
Table 1.  Complexity typology for irrigated water management
Types Characteristic Irrigation- livelihood implications
Rainfed farming
(no irrigation)
Non-interconnected
farming
Farmers are not inter-dependent for their water.
Success dependent on timing/amount of rain.
Rainfall harvesting Smaller, less connected
systems
Farmers have high-risk attitude to RH cropping.
Success dependent on timing/amount of rain.
Supplementary
irrigation
Rainfall contributes
significantly to crop
Farmers not critically dependent on irrigation, but
irrigation can extend area cultivated
Groundwater-
sourced individual
surface system
Energy required to
source water
Non-sequential access
Security of access and costs can promote marginal
use of water, higher performance, timely planting and
fewer top-to-tail differences.   
Piped irrigation
systems (sprinkler
and drip)
Energy required to
source water.  Non-
sequential access
because of pressurised
piped delivery.
Particular type of cropping system unlikely to be
faced by majority of poor irrigators.  Piped highly-
structured systems ensure minimised problems of
subtractability and sequential access.
Small-scale surface
irrigation (<25 ha)
Smaller, lesser-
connected systems
On small systems, farmers likely to have built their
own canal system have higher social cohesion; have
smaller canal distances and fewer bifurcation points.
Medium-to-large
surface scale
irrigation
Social and canal
complexity increasing
Water demand increases
Systemic properties and complexity non-linearly
increases in size; sensitises system to water
shortages, inequality, water shortages and social
conflict.
Irrigated river
basins &
catchments
A number of systems
inter-connected by
riverine/ aquifer
resources
Large distances involved; high complexity, little
sense of community, difficult to re-dress water
abstraction, considerable transaction costs in water
management, control & re-allocation
Secondly, the control of water as a crop input in surface irrigation is complex because a
changing, limited supply has to be matched with a changing and in cases unlimited demand.
Often water distribution is hierarchical, creating the need to divide water flows to command
areas leading to interactions between flow rate, flow duration, flow interval, area supplied,
losses and timing of arrival.  In open channels, water is difficult to measure and meter, and
takes time to arrive; it cannot be stored, pressurised and be ‘on-tap’ as in pipe flow.  Supply is
affected by changing rainfall, riverflow and evaporation.  On the demand side, cropping
patterns, planting dates and soil types change in space and time.  Canal losses, multi-purpose
uses, unsanctioned abstractions, irrigation at night-time, poor maintenance and farmer
perceptions of idealised water demand add further complexities.
Thirdly, irrigation acquires systemic qualities because interactive and multi-functional
relationships emerge between infrastructure and users, either locally or non-locally. A
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network is not a collection of individual users sourcing water independently.  The design and
operation of a turnout at the head of a canal influences the operation and discharge of a
turnout further down the canal.  Furthermore, feedback mechanisms exist between soil type,
the design of field layouts and field canals, volume applied per irrigation (including losses)
and the amount of water available to begin the next irrigation cycle on time.  If one field is
over-irrigated, delivery to the next is delayed.   Thus scheduling is dependent on water use
within fields as well as canal regulation.  These factors mean that, at the higher system level,
operation criteria less related to individual farmers’ wants are required to meet collective
needs.   
The other ‘systems dimension’ of larger irrigation systems is that they are situated within
national and international markets and political economies. Irrigation systems are
concentrated ‘bread baskets’ that generate considerable income from the sale of crops.  For
example a 500 ha rice system generates 324 million shillingi from yields of 15 bags/acre sold
at 18 000 tsh/bag.   Irrigation systems respond to signals related to costs, prices and access to
markets and in turn stimulate and influence the development of market services.
Fourthly, irrigation performance is affected by ‘activity factors’ dictated by human resources
such as time, timing, farming and irrigating skills, labour, physical strength and negotiating
skills.  Irrigation is an activity that sits alongside other livelihood activities.  Thus, farmers
can turn up late, employ unskilled irrigators, not monitor all of their fields, not fix small
problems, go home early, not inform neighbouring farmers about water management issues,
request water earlier or later than expected, steal water, release too much water, not have time
to join meetings, not agitate for canal cleaning, be marginalized, and so on.  All of these
activities affect water management, water control and water productivity.
The net effect of the complex nature of ‘larger irrigation systems’ is to generate inter-farmer,
inter-system and inter-sector competition over a scarce resource.   The downside of irrigation
is increased conflict over water.  It is a key thesis of this paper that in water scarce situations
(which nowadays is more common) governments and donors should be aware of the need for
land and water conflict mediation as much as for irrigation development.
Inappropriate irrigation interventions
Donors and agencies are not unaware of the issues of low performance, social conflict and
environmental impacts (e.g. over-abstraction from river basins) associated with irrigation.
However, the solutions and interventions designed to improve water management are often
problematic.  Whereas one may say 'the policy was poorly delivered', one cannot escape the
fact that poor understanding of water underlies ineffective interventions.  A few examples of
such flaws in reasoning are explained here. 
The first miscalculation is that participatory community-orientated design and management
will improve water management.  In many cases, this may hold true, however, water control
on large canal systems needs strong main system management able to take decisions that
relate more to scale of the system than to its constituent individuals.  Likewise, water
distribution on a river serving many intakes needs a ‘basin approach’ implying centralised
monitoring or management to reconcile upstream/downstream use.  Community projects may
work well with stationary forest resources being harvested by geographically bounded
communities, but they have their limitations when one community subtracts water from
another that may be many kilometres away.  A community approach is limited because of the
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distances involved in river basins and consequent lack of ‘community’.  In other words, a
centralised view helps meet the necessary needs of many and not the wants of a few.   
A second flaw in reasoning can be demonstrated with the way ‘modernisation’ is conceived
and implemented (Lankford and Gillingham, 2001) using a beguiling theory that believes
irrigation efficiency can be improved by modernisation of key infrastructure.  In Tanzania,
improvements to intakes involve changing from a traditional design (usually stones and
sandbanks) to a modern design (concrete weir and steel gates).  Yet, in case after case, the
internal water distribution in irrigation systems is not improved.  Instead the result has been
the drying up of rivers and increased conflict between abstractors.   Concrete intakes allow
much more water to be taken particularly during low flow periods (previously the traditional
intake would be left 'high and dry' allowing a by-pass flow).  Ironically, it is the one
intervention that farmers want when they voice their priorities – but this is to save labour on
maintaining traditional intakes. This is an example of the risks posed by meeting community-
voiced demands, suggested in the previous paragraph.
A third example is the wrong assumption that suggests farmers need to buy their water.  In
Tanzania, this has been attempted by sale of purchasable water rights.  However, the policy is
highly problematic (Lankford, 2001a).  In Tanzania, irrigation water is unlikely to be metered
and monitored and so farmers may take more than their “fair share”.  With a fixed payment
farmers may not use the marginal rule – on the contrary – having paid for a right, they may be
inclined to use more water.  Institutionally, fee collection is difficult because of weak
logistical support in the face of the large distances involved.  The fees are not used to provide
a better service (again because of logistics) or secure water since this is largely dictated by
nature.  In some cases, the rights are simply water duties without being reconciled with the
size of the system, available water or downstream needs, in which case water is not
effectively available.  In addition, because rivers change dramatically from wet to dry
seasons, and from wet to dry years, the fixed rights approach only works for ‘statistically
mean’ flows.  In dry years, the right is greater than the available water, legitimising the
abstraction of water until the river is left dry.  Conversely, for wet years, the right is less than
the available water, and probably less than the actual abstracted amount because intake gates
are surcharged with high flows.  
Other ‘solutions’ are also risk-laden. For example, it is believed (particularly by
commentators with no experience of managing irrigation) that pipes or lined canals improve
irrigation – yet no mention is made of the economics, or the farmer’s costs in managing and
maintaining piped supplies or of the real gains in water productivity. Others hold that the
'more efficient' private sector (or privatised wings of irrigation departments) should design
and manage irrigation systems – again with no explanation of how these institutional reforms
will be effective, economically viable, and whether such services are needed.
A paradox arises here; interventions need not be solutions.  Options succeed in places but fail
in others, impinging deleteriously on water control.  Basic irrigation thinking is often an
amplification of the following: “Motivate farmers, take water out of a river, move it along
some canals and deliver it to crops”.  Yet the default thinking should be that irrigation is
expensive, contrary, complex, and strongly associated with competition over a scarce
resource.  It is into this multi-dimensional, inter-connected dynamic system that options need
to be so cautiously considered, applied and refined.
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Analysis of irrigation livelihoods and river basin dimensions
The remainder of this paper explores three aspects of irrigation interventions focused on
livelihood issues: 1) the potential and suitability of irrigation; 2) access to irrigation and its
‘livelihoods’ nature; 3) its fit alongside a diversified livelihood.  Subsequently, two additional
topics are examined; the dominant intervention in Tanzania designed to improve irrigation,
and the competitive, common-property nature of water.
The potential and suitability of irrigation
From a farmer’s perspective, irrigation is not always appropriate, economically feasible,
required, or likely to be successful in all situations.  When left to farmers, a rather narrow
window of opportunity exists because of the range of constraints and risks.  Too dry and there
is insufficient rainfall to create large enough streams to provide secure flows for a season
length of at least 120 days.  Too wet and farmers utilise rainfall to grow crops.  In addition,
catchments need to be ‘just so’ having aquifers or being large enough to yield secure and
sufficient water.  The economic and demographic context also affects farmer-decisions
regarding irrigation.   Farmers may see no reason to invest in socially complex irrigation
when rainfall meets their needs or when no effective market demand exists for their produce.
This farmer-perspective contrasts with the formal institutional view that the Government
should deliver the considerable potential for irrigation.  There is potential, but this needs to be
divided into the following:  
Large smallholder schemes located on the eastern floodplains of Tanzania where large rivers
are found incising tracts of relatively under-utilised land.  They are currently not common
because of the substantial amount of capital and engineering needed to construct un-erodable
headworks and conveyance networks.  Farmer-owned small systems fed by the larger rivers
on low-lying floodplains are rare because of the difficulty in lifting water to acquire
command (although irrigation is found on smaller banks within the river channel and where
farmers use pumps to lift water). 
New farmer-owned smallholder might be found in some of the wetter regions of the country.
These would emulate the systems found in the Usangu and Kilosa regions, and likely sites are
in the Kilombero and Ruvu/Mgeta valleys.  Systems are rare because rainfall is sufficient or
because population numbers and needs are relatively low and are being met by other
livelihood activities such as rainfed agriculture and livestock.
Extension of existing smallholder systems can occur via upgrading and modernising intakes
and the canal network to theoretically raise irrigation efficiency, improve water management
and increase water distribution.  Yet farmers themselves are better suited to decide on
whether this is feasible and necessary.2
There are dangers in believing the Government can ‘roll out’ irrigation expansion without
risks. Indeed a lack of contextual analysis could be blamed for the siting of large-scale
                                                     
2 Chanzuru irrigators have had irrigation for more than 10 years, however it is only in the last
3-5 years that irrigation has become more profitable, productive, attractive and larger in
area. It is the farmers themselves who are agitating to expand their irrigated area by
commanding the Masai land and begin dry season irrigation.
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systems in places where smaller systems were already competing over water (e.g. Lower
Moshi in the Pangani Basin).
In summary, three issues stand out: 1) farmers choose to irrigate depending on livelihood,
environmental and water circumstances; 2) in under-irrigating areas, the government may be
more advised to generate an enabling environment that encourages farmers to consider
irrigating, and while this may still not provide the first type of capital-intensive scheme, it
would attract farmers to invest in new and existing systems; and 3) the ‘potential irrigation’
narrative of the GoT strategy papers misses a more pressing issue of conflict mediation in
existing irrigated areas where the demand to expand irrigation is ever present. 
 
Access to an irrigated livelihood - the privileged nature of irrigation
Because water is often the limiting resource, irrigation is a privileged not a widespread
solution (Moris, 1997).  This is evidenced in Usangu and Chanzuru where it secures benefits
at the rate of about 1 farmer or 2 farmers per acre for those able to rent land.  In Tanzania,
most irrigation systems are found between 10 to 500 hectares, providing for households that
number in tens and hundreds not thousands.  Furthermore, in areas with a history of irrigation
it is a choice of cropping that accrues to farmers who already have sufficient assets, either as
a result of irrigated cropping or from other jobs or by borrowing to rent into irrigation.  For
example, when the Ilonga system was extended, incomers were reasonably well-off villagers
and staff from the nearby research station.  
Villagers in Chanzuru said that rainfed land was needed to make up the food requirements
that irrigation alone could not provide for.  In fact a total of 42 per cent of the three Chanzuru
villagers owned no land at all, even though these were sub-villagers that had access to an
irrigation system, and even though land was available to rent, only 41 per cent of the total
village respondents cultivated rice, the key indicator of irrigation activity.
The following subsections describe the issue of access to irrigation where this considers:
initial access which turns a rainfed farmer or non-farmer into an irrigator; and deepening or
gaining access which turns an irrigator into a more secure irrigator or irrigator with more
land.  Research in Chanzuru revealed a ladder of irrigation-related wealth (see Figure 1).  At
the bottom exist those with no access to irrigation; these often tend to be women, the poorest,
poor rainfed farmers, incomers or youth (LADDER, 2001).  Above them lie a number of tiers
that represent greater wealth in irrigation terms.  At the top of the scale are found wealthier
landlords who rent land out but do not cultivate themselves.  A person can occupy more than
one rung; he or she can be a cultivator waiting for water to arrive at their field, whilst
labouring for a cultivator further up in the irrigation system.
Getting access to irrigation is a precursor to an irrigation-based livelihood - and is therefore a
critical step.  The Chanzuru study showed that initial access does not need to go via
labouring, it can leap directly to renting or owning irrigated land depending on
circumstances.  Initial access occurs in four main ways, as explained in Table 2.  These are;
land, water, capital and labour.  Also affecting the decision to enter into irrigation are other
factors, such as market conditions – but for clarity, they are described in the section on
widening and deepening access.  
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Figure 1.  Ladder of irrigation related status
Status
Absentee landlords
Large landlord /
cultivators
Smaller owner-
landlord /
cultivators
Renter cultivators
Small landlords /
but not cultivating
Labourers with
irrigation jobs
Those with no
access to irrigation
Land
Disregarding for the moment the title of the land, access to either 'irrigated land' or ‘irrigable
land’ is critical3. Acquiring either occurs via a number of routes: it can be bought, hired,
inherited, re-privatised, or is given away, either by village or by purchase and then by
donation.  An individual, group, NGO, Government or donor body develops irrigable land
and farmers then join the scheme.
There tends to be a minimum plot size below which irrigation does not occur.  Understanding
the reasons for this is central to finding ways of affecting the distribution curve of land for
poor farmers.  In Chanzuru, the minimum size plot was 1.0 acre but in rare cases was 0.5
acre, this is because an area below that “does not support a family”, “is not rented out by
landlords because they prefer not to subdivide too much” and “because there is high
competition for small 1.0 to 2.0 acre plots”.   The median rice plot size was 1 acre for men,
and 0.75 acres for women.4 
Land ownership and tenure affects access to irrigable and irrigated land.  Some irrigated land
in Chanzuru is owned by the village and is rented out to villagers.  While this sounds
equitable, it is apparently controlled by a few landowners making it difficult to get hold of
‘village land’.  Others said that “getting hold of land near the intake is very difficult as it is
“controlled by Sido sub-village”, which is seen by many to be the richest sub-village.  Of
those that rent, 17 per cent do so from own family members, and 83 per cent from other
individuals.   There was agreement that renting in land was more profitable than renting out
                                                     
3 Irrigated land is land that comes with an assured supply of water.  Irrigable land is land that
either has intermittent supply or is land that feasibly lies within the command area of a
source of water.
4 The dry season irrigation and rainfed area has a median size of 1.0 acres approximately,
though the mean for those is 0.9 acres and 2.0 acres respectively, meaning farmers farm
larger rainfed plots than dry season irrigation plots.
Various factors affect upward or downward
movement of irrigators
Gaining initial access to irrigated land is critical
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land5 (negotiations are set between renter and landlord, and are not mediated by third parties). 
The total area of irrigated land in Chanzuru has been increasing6, meaning that both land and
water has been available. Chanzuru irrigators have on average cultivated about 1.4 to 1.5
acres for the last three to five years, and most said they had plans to increase to 2.0 acres and
to start dry season irrigation next year mainly because the Masai land had become available.   
To improve access, pro-poor land redistribution may be feasible.  A precedent already exists
in Chanzuru because small plots (0.25 acre) of rainfed land are ‘given’ to poor people in
exchange for their labour, yet this is not currently practiced on the rice system where the
smallest plots tend to be 1.0 acre.  In addition, purposive land distribution can be achieved at
the beginning or rehabilitation of a project when outside agencies have room and leverage to
manoeuvre7. Clearly, here lies an opportunity to apportion land to different types of villagers
in different ways as occurred during the upgrading of the Ilonga intake (upstream of the
Chanzuru intake), accompanied by an expansion of the irrigated area.  One policy insight
here is that encouraging and enabling micro-plots of 0.25 and 0.5 acres might be very
important to allow the poorest a foothold in irrigation.  Related to this is a re-distribution
issue from larger plots to normal sized plots of 1.0 acre8.  There is irrigator interest in re-
distribution demonstrated by reports of a letter being sent to the village leaders (who
according to some irrigators have large plots) requesting a resolution of this issue.
Chanzuru farmers noted that new farms at the periphery of the system were water short, being
“far from the source” and “farmers block the canal” (in order to obtain their own water).  This
is a classic situation of acquiring irrigable land rather than irrigated land.  There were mixed
opinions about whether land close to water had a higher rental value than that far away, but
clearly competition for land is sufficient to warrant a higher price for irrigated land. 
In Chanzuru, large tracts of rainfed land have been appropriated by a local businessman who
intends to farm commercially.  Although this affects maize, it is a clear example of the way in
which land tenure has affected the food security of poor people in the village – irrigated land
is insufficient.  Counterbalanced against this is the release of new irrigable land because
Masai have been evicted following a long-running dispute.  This has only recently happened,
and it is not clear what this will mean for re-distribution of the vacated land.
With regards to the argument that wholly new irrigation systems can be constructed, this
provision is not relevant in Chanzuru because it was found that farmers are already extending
the existing layout.  Again, the livelihood insight here is to build on existing skills and
energies.  The policy condition is that if new land development is conducted in the future
                                                     
5 for the latter the “owner only gets the rent price” whereas the renting land allowed “you to
grow rice and generate more income”
6 mainly as a response to demand
7 The work by Koopman et al (2001) in Tanzania reveals its plausibility, success and positive
community outcome of redistribution. 
8 There was resentment about those with large plots of land, although facts were difficult to
obtain.  Discussions in Chanzuru revealed that about 7.0 acres was the upper limit for one
farmer to manage; above this and “the management of water would deteriorate”.  Quite a
few respondents felt that the current distribution was unfair.
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then institutional establishment processes will be critical to their success. Perhaps the
engineering design of new schemes should stop at the headworks only, allowing the
distribution system to be worked out by farmers? .9
Another important land access route comes from smallholder resettlement.  This is not
applicable to Chanzuru but in Usangu there is an argument that the existing commercially
orientated farms belonging to the parastatal NAFCO could be re-distributed to poor families
as an example of irrigation management transfer.  Although this is happening informally via
private rental agreements, it could be formalised to meet desirable pro-poor outcomes.  If
conducted at the rate of 1 acre per family, this could provide land for more than 6000 families
on both Kapunga and Mbarali farms.
Water
While gaining access to irrigable land is important, equally important is secure water.  For the
poorest, small amounts of water, or enhanced security of supply is marginally and vitally
more beneficial.  This curvilinear productivity response is the objective of managing water as
a crop input. Reducing top-end surfeit of water to reduce tail-end deficit increases
productivity across the whole system.
The picture is muddied because water can have other functions.  It can control weeds, to level
soils, and to soften soil to allow ploughing.  At the end of the season when less crop water is
needed, water is used to wet fields to grow dry season crops or rice ratoons.  In addition, top-
end farmers value security over amount leading to more water horded than is agronomically
necessary.  
In addition, depending on seasonality and location, water has changing value in comparison
to changing livelihood strategies.  Thus top- and mid-end farmers who have received water
on their plot may not transplant but instead seek more immediately profitable work labouring
on another’s farm (SMUWC, 2001).  This livelihood tactic creates a mosaic of wetted but
bare plots, which reduces total system efficiency and stops more needy farmers from getting
water.  Interestingly, in Usangu after the drought of 2000, smallholders on one system agreed
new rules about absentee farmers with the intention of tightening up on planting and water
distribution.
                                                     
9 In general, developing new lands for irrigation is a risky endeavour, requiring planning,
capital, resources and time to assist users in formulating water user groups and conventions
for sharing water.  Observations show that where local people use their own resources to
develop irrigation, the ‘debts’ in effort, time and money tend to become embedded in their
expectations and contributions to on-going management.  Where outside institutions attempt
to develop or enhance irrigation, these ‘social capital’ factors tend to be less well developed;
water user associations tend to be artificial and less sustainable.
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Table 2. Four resources and characteristics of irrigated livelihoods affecting access to irrigated plots of land
Access resource What is it? Why does it arise? What does it lead to? What is the household
livelihoods approach to
the solution?
What is the group, village
NGO, district & river
basin solution?
Access to
irrigation land
Below a defined area,
people are excluded from
accessing direct benefits
of cultivating their own
crops.  In Chanzuru, the
area is about 0.5 to 1.0
acre.
There is often intense competition
for small plots of land.  Landlords
tend not to rent out smaller plots,
plus farmers feel that that 1 acre
provides work & income for a small
family unit and more money would
be required for larger plots.
The poorest of the poor are
not able to get a foothold
on the benefits of
cultivating and selling their
own crops.
People cope by selling their
labour to other growers, by
cultivating small areas of
rainfed land and by micro-
diversification.
Demarcate land for micro-
plots of irrigation? 
Revolve plots on an annual
basis? (Applicable to
village owned land)
IMT transfer & settlement
Access to water
(Conflict-area
tradeoffs)
Access depends on water
availability.  Improved
internal supply and
distribution of water
resolves conflicts but
extends area irrigated
leading to additional
farmers and increased risk
of new conflict.
Irrigation interconnectivity between
users reflects a common-pool
resource. In middle or tailend
reaches, or in downstream irrigation
systems, water supply is variable and
insecure.  Getting access to small
amounts of water may have high
marginal benefits to the poor.
Resolving waste and inefficiency in
upstream areas releases water to
downstream farmers. 
Increased risk of conflict
and shocks when water
supply contracts,
necessitating conflict
resolution, a search for
increased supply or a
contraction in irrigated
area.   Extending irrigation
provides benefits but
increases chances of
conflict in normal & drier
periods.
People cope and are
opportunistic.  Farmers
may move to better served
plots.  Labour transactions
change.  Individuals may
attempt to hoard water.
Group planning is required
to limit & improve
irrigation in zones beyond
which risky water supply
occurs.  Improve
upstream/downstream
control via river basin
management.  Deliver
small amounts of water for
lifeline needs (e.g.
compensation flows or
piped domestic supply)
Access to capital Farmers in Chanzuru need
money to rent land
Irrigated farming has become
increasingly commercialised.  
Obtaining financial capital to
purchase land or water may be
borrowe money or by providing
labour.  Very poor farmers may be
excluded from this, but increasingly
will consider credit.
Borrowing of money
against future cropping.
Savings from cropping or
other income streams
Formal or informal credit
systems were found to exist
in Chanzuru either at
household level or from
NGO in Ilonga
Formal or informal credit
systems managed by NGO,
with enabling environment
dictated by Govt.
Access to
labour/energy
To gain access to irrigated
land at the bottom rung
necessitates the provision
of labour. 
Labour may provide initial means to
derive benefits from irrigated land
either through direct access,
sharecropping or paid labour
Labour or energy is
required either to prepare
land, or to work on another
land or to access water.
People cope by working for
water or land.  Labour
duties are shared out.
Planting mosaics.
Guidance still required on
impact of labour-selling on
water management and
efficiency.
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In the Chanzuru system, differentiation into well supplied top-enders and poorly supplied
tail-enders was not as clearly seen in other systems in Usangu.  This is because permeable
soils, a fluctuating water table and undulating land wets soil some distance from the intake.
In the survey, many farmers did not associate distance from the intake with dryness, except
for the most recent farms being added to the system.  This is also reflected in the inelastic
cost of land rental across the irrigation system, and the fact that research by Bevan (2001) did
not detect any trends in livelihood diversification related to top-to-tail water availability.  
There is evidence from the Ilonga and Chanzuru irrigation systems that recent improvements
in water management have spread water more widely, ensuring greater security of water to
tailend areas and a general increase in total irrigated area.  Until about five years ago, rice
was grown using broadcasting and flooding but, as a result of Sukuma incomers
demonstrating basin irrigation, rice is now transplanted in vijaruba (small flat basins) fed by
a greater number of feeder canals than before.  This technology was copied widely resulting
in improved water control, doubled yields and extended water coverage.  Another change in
recent times has been the use of the dry season to irrigate crops, made possible by the
perennial (though dry-season reduced) flow of the Ilonga River.  Many farmers interviewed
said that dry season cropping was on the increase every year.
Importantly these two changes happened without government intervention.  In fact as one
villager put it, “if the Sukuma practice had been shown by an extension agent we would
probably have ignored it”.  
One unhelpful institutional requirement has been the payment of 35,000 Tsh to the District
for a water right (via the collection of 500 tsh from each irrigator).   To date, no such right
has been issued, or has any information been given to them regarding their abstraction rate.  
The key question is: how much more can the area can keep extending?  With the removal of
the Masai and the closure of rainfed lands there is real pressure to maximise the irrigated
area, but this seems problematic despite being desirable. There is a poor relationship between
the WUA and the village government which has resulted in reduced fee collection (only 28
per cent of Chanzuru respondents said they belonged to a WUA), a lack of rules being drawn
up, a lack of rule enforcement and consequently conflict over water sharing.  The corollary to
this is that many irrigators want to replace the WUA chairman who is seen to be blocking
progress on these issues.  
Capital
Although irrigated land may be acquired by non-financial means, access to capital is the
precursor to acquiring irrigated land and water.  Prices for renting have risen from 3000
tsh/acre in 1998 to 5000 tsh/acre in 1999 to 10-15 000 tsh/acre in 2001, with prices of 30-50
000 tsh also quoted.  Gaining access to land via renting is a monetised process; farmers
acquire capital to rent land principally by borrowing credit from lenders or the landlord or by
partly providing their own labour to irrigators in top-end reaches that have already received
an irrigation supply.  In rare circumstances farmers undertake sharecropping.  Even less
observed is the creation of capital from diversified non-agricultural incomes to invest in
agriculture. Many villagers also indicated that it was not possible to sell labour at a
sufficiently profitable rate to then rent land – though clearly renters mixed their own cropping
with selling labour on farms.
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One policy insight here comes from an irrigating farmer who said the rural NGO credit
scheme (FINCA) located in Ilonga Village had helped him secure capital to rent land.  For
him access to capital to rent land was vitally important, yet villagers as a whole ranked
FINCA as being generally unhelpful because interest rates where high and grace periods
short (LADDER, 2001).  Lack of credit was seen to be a major constraint by most villagers.
Labour
Lastly, labour may be a way of accessing the value of irrigated land (if not the title) where the
intention is simply to become a waged labourer without using that money to start cultivating.
Villagers in Chanzuru said this was unprofitable because the labour pool was large and
salaries small.  However, for the poorest, this is one source of income.
Crop input and agronomic factors
The play of the above factors affects initial access to irrigation, from then on the direction can
be upwards, downwards or stationary.  Table 3 demonstrates ways that continue to undermine
or benefit irrigated livelihoods.
With regards to crop productivity, the Ilonga River irrigators tend to solve their own
cultivation problems, including the judicious use of fertiliser in certain kinds of crops.
According to the villagers, the extension officer, once reasonably visible now hardly visits
(LADDER 2001).  However, there were certain yield problems that farmers could not fix
such as yellow spot on rice.  Here, farmers saw yellow spot as a major problem halving
yields, and the lack of extension advice as damaging.   In Usangu, farmers complain that top-
end fields are declining in soil fertility (i.e. 12 bags/acre), while tail-end fields with water still
yield at 18 bags/acre.  Yet, farmers with secure water at the top of the Kimani system in
Usangu are carting in farmyard manure, an interesting sign of perceived balance between
security of water and the costs and benefits of additional inputs.
Farmer incentive environments; markets and inputs
The study of Chanzuru irrigation demonstrates that irrigation expands and is competed over
despite a lack of visible intervention by government or provision by the government of
inputs.   Villagers state that the increasing price of rice relative to costs of inputs is one
important reason why rice cultivation has increased in area.  Counterbalancing this was a
decline in the rice price for 2001 from about 25 000 tsh/bag to 8-10 000 tsh/bag because of
good rains throughout Tanzania and a glut of rice on the market.  The location of Chanzuru
on the main road between Ilonga and Morogoro benefits market access – another aspect of
irrigation that farmers implicitly factor in.
By mass-producing high yielding cash crops, irrigation systems become function orientated,
responding to a wider economic environment..   Farmers both sense this and the nature of the
incentive environment into which they fit.  Thus a highly appropriate irrigation-livelihood
intervention is not necessarily the upgrading of infrastructure or establishment of WUA’s, but
the provision of predictable, accessible markets.  Lower transaction costs (e.g. reducing the
number of rural taxes on the movement of goods) explored by Ellis and Mdoe (2002) help
incentivise the desire of farmers to participate in irrigated agriculture.  
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Table 3. Factors affecting deepening/widening access to irrigation-based livelihood enhancement 
Factors affecting movement up/down Brief explanation Move up Move down
LAND
 Land availability
 Land given & inherited
 Land bought & sold
 Land rented
The amount of total land available, and the
degree to which portions of it are available
to villagers affects irrigated livelihood
options
Land becomes more available, small
plots made available, prices stabilise,
landlords provide good contracts.
Land becomes less available, or market for
smaller plots becomes more competitive.
Richer farmers rent more land marginalising
poorer farmers.  Prices increase raising risk
element when borrowing money.
WATER & CLIMATE
 Water availability
 Improve intake
 Acquire new intake or pump
 Equitable predictable climate
 Control of upstream users
The amount, predictability, timeliness,
location, distribution of water enables
farmers to plan and manage water
accordingly, enhancing irrigation
livelihoods.
Water becomes more secure, available,
predictable, better distributed, less prone
to disruption by upstream irrigators.
Water becomes less secure, less available,
more frequently taken by upstream irrigators,
or affected by weeds, leaks etc.
CROP
 Yellow spot
 Rainfed maize yield
Potential yields are blighted by disease and
lack of rainfall.
Good maize and rice yields raise
incomes, allowing farmers to invest in
further assets
A poor rice yield due to yellow spot
infestation or poor maize reduces income and
can lead to debt.  Poor maize can also knock
farmers down.
LABOUR/ENERGY
 Availability of own/other labour
 Cost of labour/energy
Providing energy for farm work either
prepares land or ensures water
Energy/labour cost benefit ratio is
advantageous providing land and water.
Land or water has an energy/labour cost
exceeding benefits from energy/labour.
DIVERSIFIED LIVELIHOODS
E.g. Micro-enterprise, urban-rural migration,
rainfed agriculture / dry season irrigation,
livestock, labouring
An ability to save money from other
activities and not borrow money creates bi-
directional investment between agriculture
& other streams.  Time balance here.
Other income sources become
developed.  Capital used to access
irrigation land or vice versa - irrigation
income used to build other enterprises.
Opportunities erode, individuals rely on few
sources or permanently /temporarily migrate.
Access to rainfed land decreases.  Failure in
one activity drains others.
ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL
 Capital, debt, borrowing
 Input and labour costs, demand
 Credit & financial planning mgt
 Market prices, stability & transaction
costs
Access to capital, and costs of borrowing
money as a household or individual affect
ability to change one's livelihood.  Access
to functioning markets with acceptable
prices and minimal transaction costs. 
Terms and cost of borrowing amenable
to cover access and initial start-up costs
with leeway to allow for delays in
payment.  Market is accessible,
predictable, easy to enter into, prices
profitable.
Borrowing costs are high, and terms are
unfavourable, capturing or depleting other
resources previously built up.  Markets not
accessible, prices crash, transaction costs high.
SOCIAL
 Social cohesion & conflict resolution
 Social/customary access to land
 'Competition'
The access to land and water can be
affected by social factors such desire and
competition to add to assets, and by
organisation and conflict resolution.
Village and water user association
communicate, incomers bring new ideas,
farmers meet to resolve conflicts.
Competition, bullying and intimidation
present, poor WUA organisation, break-down
in village communication, & gender or age
marginalisation/exclusion to land.
WATER INSTITUTIONS
 Local village & WUA bye-laws
 Control of river basin abstraction
 Support by zonal irrigation office
Some social factors affecting access
explicitly acknowledge in commonly
agreed, written bye-laws and legislation.
Supporting policy & project environment
Bye-laws understood, adopted, and used
in assisting protection and or
development of resources and in
resolving conflicts.
Organisation breaks down, legislation is no
longer utilised or known about. Policy
environment erodes activities/plans made at
the household and village level.
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Furthermore, market signals generate comparative incentives for farmers to improve water
management, underlain by their investments in infrastructure.   Thus farmers will decide to line
or rebuild canals when the value of doing so outweighs the costs of not doing so.  Examples of
these decisions are found in Usangu; farmers do not upgrade the intake but will rebuild a canal
wall that has collapsed.  In the former, the water supply is not under threat, whereas in the latter
it is.  It is the argument of this paper that farmers are better placed than governments to make
these detailed system-level economic decisions.
Social factors 
When during the research problem ranking was conducted, villagers did not readily identify
those driven by social factors (see LADDER, 2001).   Yet a variety of cultural and social norms
appear to be affecting access to land and water.  For example, female farmers cannot own land,
but were renting land and providing labour on other farms.  Of the irrigator respondents, 67 per
cent were male and 32 per cent were female.   Regarding plans by village youth (16 – 24 yrs) to
grow rice, interesting observations were made by villagers:  “Previously into beer drinking,
they now expect great changes in the next two years from the land released by the Masai”.  
Villagers also held the view that the ‘vision to adopt new technologies’ was constrained by low
levels of education – though this contradicts the rapid adoption of basin irrigation by villagers
from Sukuma incomers.  In addition, although not expressed during the Chanzuru PRA
exercises, the purposive irrigation interviews did reveal that underlying the conflict between the
village and WUA leaderships is the desire by irrigators to question the existing socially-
determined incentives and penalties of the WUA in order to enhance water management.
Diversification and irrigation
The causal direction of success in irrigation and success in diversifying into other activities
cannot always be predicted but it is possible to say that success in irrigation provides a means to
diversify, whereas in Chanzuru, diversifying without irrigation is more problematic. 
Interviews with villagers in Tanzania (see Box 1) suggest that irrigation is a mainstay of income
and that where possible most interviewees wished to have both irrigation and at least one other
activity in order to maximise income.  Two further facets can be identified.  Firstly, farmers
with small-scale diversifications (such as beer or selling own labour) saw irrigation as an
important but seasonal activity providing much needed income. (“One cannot forget
irrigation”).  During irrigating times, other enterprises can become dormant.  There were also
examples where minor business people (such as sugarcane sellers and café-owners) point to
irrigation being the source of capital to start their other activities.  They used sums of 5000 Tshs
to obtain materials or rent land to try other crops.  Although irrigation was less necessary in
these cases, it was highly desirable and could be 100 per cent prioritised when necessary.  It
was also likely that another family member would cover non-agricultural duties.
Diversification into irrigation (out of rainfed agriculture) occurs because villagers see the
benefit of good prices from rice and dry season crops; and because they are aware of the
security of production when compared to dry season maize; for the latter one frequently heard
“the rains are not certain”.  One of the sub-villages, Chanzuru, provided a third reason for
movement into irrigation, namely the closure of access to rainfed lands by a powerful
landowner in the area.  This is compensating rather than diversifying but it does influence
farmers moving in and out of different types of agriculture.  It is for a number of these reasons
that irrigation rental has increased in the last five years.
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Box 1. Case study  - female owner of small café in Darajani sub-village
Started in 1999. Every year the owner opens a small café in the off-season after finishing
cultivating rice, from March to December. She has 1.5 acres irrigated, 2.0 acres rainfed, but is
expecting to increase area of irrigated land to allow her daughter to cultivate some land.  Land
was originally with village, but she now owns it.  Got the capital to start from selling one bag of
maize that paid for someone to build the café and money for mugs and plates.  She also
borrowed money from the credit NGO FINCA in Ilonga to purchase bulk sugar. Now the shop
supports itself and the loan repayment.  More profit comes from irrigated rice than the café but
this may change in the future depending on business.  She had to start this because “life is so
expensive”, and husband’s income was not enough to meet many needs such as school income
and cooking oil.  If there was a drought that hit the rice she would be hard hit since customers
would stop coming, but if was just her being hit by yellow spot then perhaps the café could
support her.  The profit is about 1200 Tsh day, coming mostly from “young men with no
wives”.  She is taxed by the village development tax, but does not see what the money is used
for. Her major problem is yellow spot which halves yields of rice to 8-10 bags/acre.  She has
recently started buying and selling clothes too.
Movement into irrigation currently requires rental capital (whereas some years ago, land was
given out for a nominal sum by the Chanzuru village government).  This money, which has
been increasing steeply in the last three years, is obtained mostly by borrowing, but augmented
by some savings from, and labour within, agriculture.  
As mentioned above, diversification into labour-selling alongside irrigation also exists but can
create a mosaic of planted and non-planted but wetted plots – a theme discussed more below.  
In summary, irrigation in Chanzuru provides capital to diversify; diversification is seen as
desirable in itself (without necessarily being driven by a lack of irrigation); it enables minor
labour opportunities; but diversification does not generate a sufficient income to wholly pay for
rental access to irrigation.
Effect of diversification on sustainability and productivity of natural resource management
At the river basin level, increasing livelihood needs for water inevitably means that water is
abstracted into irrigation intakes without much regard to downstream users, so a rural-poverty,
livelihoods focus tends to promote upstream irrigation abstraction10.  Constraining this is
necessary because of other-sector needs.  Theoretically, water rights and intake designs should
balance upstream/downstream needs, but this is unlikely while river basin officers have
minimal presence in places like Kilosa District and where irrigation intakes are over-designed
for peak flow periods.  If and when water is throttled, a natural consequence will be irrigators
having to make decisions over alternative sources of income – but there is no evidence that
diversification helps reduce water demand.  This is because irrigation is so much more
profitable than other rural activities seen in Chanzuru.  Thus it may be necessary to force
throttling rather than to expect it to happen as a consequence of ‘progress’.
As far as in-system management is concerned, there was conflicting evidence that
diversification into other activities negatively affects land and water management.  One neutral
                                                     
10 This is certainly the case in the Ilonga river system where water is taken from the Ilonga and
Chanzuru offtakes up to their respective design maximum flows, in wet and dry season,
leaving little water for the downstream intake of Madota.
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stance is that water management does not deteriorate because most diversification occurs during
the off-crop season.  A more negative outlook is that diversifying into temporary labouring
when a farmer has received their water leads to a mosaic of uncultivated plots, which reduces
overall productivity and utilises water that is more urgently required by other farmers.  Farmers
clearly feel both the costs and benefits of this, and outcomes depend on collective action or
non-action, as exemplified in Usangu.
However, more positively, there may be evidence that diversification, by further raising
incomes, is an impetus to improved in-system management.  The link is tenuous, but several
people expressed plans to increase the area of irrigation to raise capital for various home and
business needs.   This desire to meet more people’s needs and increase the area irrigated will be
met by better distribution and management of water.  While this has improved over the last 10
years, villagers are aware of the need to make further changes.  This awareness can be seen in
the disputes surrounding the Water User Association.  The village government wants to replace
the current WUA chairman to improve general farmer organisation of canal maintenance and
draw up new rules and schedules.  
Infrastructural approach to improvements
Irrigation lends itself to, indeed requires, technological interventions.  This fact means that it is
subject to risks of under-design and inappropriate design.  The predominant approach to
irrigation interventions in the last 20 years in Tanzania is defined by an infrastructural
emphasis, notably in the construction of concrete intakes to replace traditional intakes.
Chanzuru farmers all mentioned that an improved intake would benefit them.  Yet Lankford
and Gillingham (2001) reviewed the evidence from the Usangu Basin and saw that improved
intakes caused the system to over-abstract, leaving the environment or lower irrigation systems
dry (even if they too had new intakes).  There is no evidence that Chanzuru irrigators are short
of water because of a traditional intake; their desire for a concrete one stems from lower
maintenance costs.
There are two policy insights here.  Firstly, a policy of non-intervention may be the best;
irrigation does not necessarily require considerable investment in infrastructure, though this is
what most farmers would wish.  Secondly, if intakes are to be built, they should be constructed
in ways that explicitly share water between upstream and downstream demands.  Proportional
or castellated weirs as described in Lankford (2001a, 2001b) are applicable here.
Conflict resolution – institutional arrangements
Related to points made about inappropriate infrastructure, water-scarcity and multi-sectoral
demand, special consideration needs to be given to irrigation conflict resolution vis-à-vis
providing new irrigation.  A range of institutional arrangements can assist communities in
regulating and managing their water abstraction, providing important mediating processes
affecting access to natural resources.  
Three tiers seem appropriate; irrigation-level user agreements; sub-catchment level user
agreements, and a higher-level overview.  Of the first, water user associations (WUA’s) are
common examples of this – and such an organisation, albeit moribund, was found in Chanzuru.
Of the second, both traditional and new river user associations (RUA’s) are found in the
Usangu.  For example the SMUWC project set up a RUA termed a sub-catchment management
resource programme (SRMP) in the Kimani River, which was seen as highly desirable by users.
Farmers in the Mkoji-subcatchment in Usangu already meet, without outside involvement, to
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agree a share of water abstracted between different intakes.  In Chanzuru, river conflicts were
rarely mentioned, something that is related to the positive ratio of supply to demand, and the
design of the improved Ilonga intake that allows water downstream. Clearly river basin
institutions are not always required. 
At a higher level, farmers primarily turn to their district council to sort out disagreements, and
in rare circumstances, where they exist, to a river basin authority.  Even if the latter
arrangement is available, its success depends on the relationship between the water right,
application and appeals procedure, cost, design and service delivered in terms of conflict
resolution.  In Usangu water rights imposed to share water were not related to the infrastructure
and did not recognise downstream environmental water demands.  Furthermore, most irrigators
interviewed in Usangu had never met a river basin officer (SMUWC, 2001).
The policy insight here is that improved institutional arrangements and facilitation mechanisms
are often inadequate but, if required, need to be attuned.
Policy Recommendations
The following paragraphs conclude on policy insights generated from this work.  Connected to
each paragraph is an existing and alternative view of irrigation policy given in Table 4.  Various
players in Tanzania including donor agencies hold the existing view.  This argues that irrigation
has clear benefits, is inefficient and has undeveloped potential or room for improvement ‘which
the government must do something about’. The replacement view is a more conditional
understanding also held by many in Tanzania. This says that irrigation potential exists in
Tanzania, but comes with unforeseen complexities; that it should be balanced against
competing demands for water; that it is only realised by farmers operating within a complex
irrigation-rural livelihoods system; and that it should be accompanied by an appreciation of the
need for conflict mediation and a river basin perspective. Table 4 is further divided into two
main sections; the upper argues for a better understanding of the irrigation-river basin approach;
while the lower argues that certain policies and strategies should reflect this approach.
An irrigation livelihoods-river basin understanding
The first set of paragraphs in Table 4 relate to an understanding of irrigation livelihoods and
river basins to inform policy formulation.
Farmer-livelihood integration.  Irrigation can reduce poverty and irrigation systems will
expand where and when a certain set of conditions exist:
1. Where physical and technical conditions – as perceived by farmers – are correct.  This
means the following are present: sufficient water as well as high security of water, good
soils, slopes, space and command.  In addition irrigation systems have technical systemic
qualities that farmers are exposed to which dictates local distribution and availability of
water.  Other technical factors such as roads and location also count.
2. Where social, institutional and human transaction costs – as perceived by farmers – are
acceptable.  For example where the village more or less totally owns the irrigation system
or where a system-wide WUA is in place that is synergistic with the village government (so
that there are few quarrels between these institutions) so that land tenure issues and water
distribution issues are resolved to assist a) landless b) the tail-enders c) downstream users.
Where farmer irrigating skills are cost effective, being learnt and adopted. Where
diversifications are, by comparison and replacement, either irrigation neutral or promote
water management.
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Table 4. Existing and ‘livelihoods-river basin’ views of irrigation policy
Stage Current view informing policy Irrigation river basin livelihoods view 
IRRIGATION UNDERSTANDING
Whose irrigation
performance?
(Farmer-livelihood
integration)
‘Irrigation suffers from performance
problems’, the solutions of which are
imposed by external players who often
see narrow ‘disciplinary’ problems.
Farmers with irrigation-based livelihoods are
integrating across a wide range of social,
economic and technical issues, responding
and succeeding accordingly.
‘Normal’ vs
cautionary irrigation
approach
‘Irrigation is the addition of water to
crops’.  Fad-type thinking influences
refinements to this theory.
Irrigation is complex and needs engaging
with, using long-term programmes.  Approach
and fund with care, using long-term
interdisciplinary, facilitator-type teams.
Irrigation potential
vs actual irrigation
livelihoods
‘Irrigation potential exists’, ready to be
fulfilled: find it with land suitability
mapping & planning.
It exists, can be fulfilled, but observe and
understand how farmers see potential, choose
to locate & develop irrigation. Assist this by
ensuring market signals and economy reduces
farmer risk and transaction costs.
A balanced
irrigation-river
basin livelihoods
approach
‘Irrigation potential should be fully
realised’.  Consideration of
downstream multi-sectoral demands
tends to be forgotten. 
Irrigation consumes water, which dries
downstream sectors, this is especially
important in a river basin with a seasonal
hydrograph.  River basin & conflict mediation
approach vital.
IRRIGATION POLICY FORMULATION AND DELIVERY
New large scale
systems
No longer popular among donors, but
when they are considered; whole
system is designed by consulting
engineers who do not operate it.
Might be necessary, but only in certain
locations and only construct headworks?  Let
farmers build or sub-contract inter-
disciplinary teams to create remainder.
Policy vs cognitive
approach
(Situational
analysis)
Policy-hegemony.  (E.g. ‘Water must
be paid for’.  ‘Rights must be
introduced’.  ‘Community management
is required’).
Adopt a problem-focus priority.  ‘What
realistically can be done to improve water
management & reduce water use in this
particular irrigation or riverine system?’ 
Institutional review
and strengthening
Create irrigation WUA’s (then these
tend to be left to own devices).  
Train farmers to own irrigation
systems.
- Three tier institutions; 1) WUA at irrigation
level (related to village govt); 2) RUA at river
level; 3) Higher at district/river basin level.
- Continue to assist in facilitation and
mediation training of all institutional levels.
- Promote synergy between levels/other
institutions
- Respond to farmer requests for help
Conflict mediation Unrecognised by agencies Equal weighting along irrigation development
Capacity and awareness building needed
Responsive, problem-orientated, demand-led
Pro-poor land &
water distribution
Generally unrecognised by agencies Conditional with new or rehabilitated
systems.  Special focus within institutional
mediation projects and programmes?
IMT on NAFCO farms
Domestic/lifeline water supplies are critical.
Technical issues
- Intake bias
Intake improvements over-emphasise
upstream abstraction
Either leave traditional intakes alone or
consider proportional weirs to divide water
- Within-irrigation
technical options
Engineers like to line canals; create
divisional networks & insist on water
cycling or suggest drip/sprinkler.
Observe/build on what farmers consider are
ways of saving/extending water.  Help them
focus on where water is being mismanaged.
- Formulating water
demand and water
right
The FAO method of demand = specific
field demand x efficiency x area
Other methods: socially agreed division;
design in drought; prior use; relate right
accurately to actual design. Re-tune design if
necessary
WUA – water user association, RUA – river user association, IMT – irrigation management transfer
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3. Where economic transaction costs – as perceived by farmers – are minimised.  On the
whole input costs should be low (e.g. people are sufficiently numerous to create a mixing
pool of labour availability and opportunities to diversify away from irrigation or within
irrigation if necessary), where the cost and availability of borrowing are amenable; where
output prices are profitable (related to market demand and stability) and market
transactions are transparent and low in cost (e.g. minimal taxes and entry barriers)
4. Where sufficient time is given for the irrigation system to settle and evolve (perhaps at
least 4 to 5 years).  This also gives users a chance to teach themselves skills, to allow
newcomers to bring fresh ideas and to observe cyclical patterns that can be planned for.
Irrigation is a long-run endeavour.
Farmers integrate across all these livelihood, economic, community, physical and irrigation
system dynamics.  The flow charts of problems drawn by farmers as a part of the research
(LADDER, 2001) demonstrate this connected complexity.  In responding to and affecting these
drivers and processes, they generally succeed ‘in context’.   In addition, these conditions of
success simultaneously mediate irrigation intervention.  If successful conditions exist, external
intervention is probably not required.  If such conditions are deleterious to irrigation, then
interventions are unlikely to be physically, economically and institutionally sustainable.  Yet,
conditions can be finely balanced; for example irrigation systems have downstream effects and
externalities.  Here, certain types of intervention are required; e.g. on conflict mediation and
water management.
‘Normal’ vs. cautionary approach. The default irrigation understanding might be that
irrigation systems are vibrant, dynamic and dependent.  These dynamics might be interpreted as
problems - some of which alarm outside organisations. However, the transaction and impact
costs of an inexperienced organisation employing ‘normal’ but fashionable irrigation thinking
to fix such problems may be higher than the costs associated with the problems themselves.  In
this case, there is a default donor situation: unless the donor has a clear track record and
advantage in the sector as well as a cognitive strategy for getting involved, it may be best to
take a highly cautious, long-term and careful tack, if at all.
Potential vs. actual irrigation.  A departing point for policy would be to build on what farmers
are themselves choosing to do.  This contrasts with a view that considerable irrigation potential
exists which must first be mapped and then fulfilled.  It is probably safer and cheaper to realise
that farmers are more sensitive to the irrigation-livelihood barriers and constraints (referred to
above) than officials are and that irrigation growth relates to farmer perceptions. This paper
argues that the surrounding regional and macro-economic policies can stimulate market and
farming activity and affect the desire to resolve water management issues.  
An irrigation-river basin livelihoods approach. Fully realising irrigation potential is risky
because irrigation consumes water. The livelihoods approach tends to maximise per capita
agricultural use at the local level, while a river basin approach check-balances that against
downstream and ‘other-sector’ use of water. The danger is that a local emphasis without a
catchment perspective might require a politically expensive re-tuning, post-hoc programme to
reconcile upstream/downstream water use.
Policy formulation and delivery 
New large-scale systems. In certain circumstances, it may be necessary for donors and GOT to
provide the capital for major works beyond the reach of poor farmers.  Herein lies the
pluralistic nature of the debate; caution is necessary when arguing for a coherent approach to
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small-scale irrigation because farmers are usually able to devise the necessary infrastructure
themselves.  Yet, there are places where new irrigation requires infrastructure constructed with
outside help.  These would by their nature not result in small-scale works, but in larger-scale
developments of smallholder irrigation.  There appears to be success already in this approach
for example at Madibira and the Kapunga Smallholder Scheme.  This argument also seems
currently out of favour with donors, who appear to lack the confidence to establish larger-scale
systems.  One solution might be simply to construct the head works and let farmers develop the
canal system.  In doing so, farmers generate skills in organising labour to construct the system
and indebt themselves to a claim on future water schedules.
Pro-poor elements could be designed into this approach, for example land settlement could part
focus on plots for women, young and the poorest.
Theoretical vs cognitive approach.  Irrigation intervention should be problem-centred rather
than policy-centred.  The latter tends to apply generic ideas insufficiently underpinned by
detail, appropriateness and flexibility.   Approaches such as introducing water rights, while
pandering to notions of water management, do not acknowledge the site and stage dimensions
of different irrigation systems.  Instead, a cognitive approach is proposed, defined by having
two key elements.  Firstly, the identification of problems and the triangulation of their nature.
This acknowledges that not all irrigation systems have problems worth tackling, and not
problems have the same roots.  The research in Chanzuru shows that rich set of irrigation-
related properties, processes and activities exists at the system, village and catchment level.  A
cognitive approach not only seeks to fully understand this, but it draws on a wide set of ideas,
best practices and criteria to solve problems.  Secondly, as well as having a flexible analytical
framework, stakeholder institutions need to be flexible, interdisciplinary and problem-focussed.
This notion is not new in irrigation writing (and is recognised by Kalinga et al 2001), but such
working modalities remain un-systemised in Government departments (for example the Draft
Water Policy barely mentions irrigation, MWLD, 2001).  Donors, who have the responsibility
to help foster such conditions, often have relatively un-developed irrigation sections themselves
(DFID is a case in point).  This raises worrying concerns about the ability to tackle irrigation in
a dedicated, focussed and relevant manner. 
The pro-poor elements of this stem from successfully extending the benefits of irrigated land by
a number of routes; from ensuring a more equitable supply of water at different scales; from
resolving conflict in a focussed manner; by signalling benefits of irrigation via market
accessibility and prices; and by minimising transaction costs (e.g. taxes and costly water rights).
Institutional review and strengthening.  The framework of institutions involved in water
resources management needs to be expanded beyond focussing on irrigation system water user
associations (WUA’s).  In addition, village, sub-catchment level and river basin institutions
need to be given careful thought.  It is here that ways can be found of addressing conflict
resolution, pro-poor poverty strategies and improved water management.  Such a framework
needs to be aware of both livelihoods and basin-wide need for water.  The newfound World
Bank policy of developing river user associations in selected Pangani sub-catchments is an
example of this.  However, this programme appears to be predicated on assumptions that local
institutions are not already present, or that this will solve the problem of allocation without
removing other constraints.  In other words, the addition of this World Bank-funded institution
may be theoretically correct but not necessarily problem-centred.
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The pro-poor elements of this are similar to above; appropriate institutional mechanisms for
delivering conflict solutions such as agreeing water scheduling rules and customs, and means of
ensuring reward, redress and penalty.
Conflict mediation.  Conflict mediation applies to both the river basin and sub-catchment
scale, but also, importantly to the irrigation system.  River basin institutions and appropriate
intake design are part of the former.  However, irrigation has special significance because,
although government and donor institutions do not need to roll out irrigation, there is a case for
their involvement and facilitation of improved water management.  However, rather than this
occurring because engineers dictate that irrigation efficiency is low, it is better framed as a
response to requests by farmers who genuinely identify and verbalise water distribution
problems.   Such an approach has important dimensions of being problem-focussed, service-
orientated, responsive, and demand led.  Various activities are envisaged; partnership
engineering, facilitation sessions, game and role-playing, farmer training, problem ranking and
participatory institutional analysis.  
The pro-poor elements of this stem from inclusion of the views of the poorest or of those bereft
of their usual water supply in resolving issues related to land and water distribution, particularly
ensuring the release of marginally small amounts of water.
Pro-poor land & water distribution.  Singled out for mention is the need to recognise the
special benefits derived from land and water distribution to the poorest within a community.
Although this should be locally determined, government attention can be drawn to it, and
mechanisms for it enhanced where possible.  Land distribution is possible when donors have
leverage during construction of new schemes or rehabilitation of existing systems.  This
includes smallholder settlement and irrigation management transfer on the two NAFCO farms
in Usangu; Kapunga and Mbarali, where it is estimated 6000 families could be located.
Water lifeline needs for the poorest are critical; not necessarily for irrigation (since the demand
is set by the threshold area cropped) but for domestic needs.  Provision of domestic water is
usually recognised as being a public good, best provided by governments, NGO’s, projects or
cost sharing with the community.  In addition, surface waters for the environment and livestock
have marginal benefits and are secured by having compensation flows below irrigation and
domestic intakes.  A river basin perspective ensures such balances are met.
Technical biases - intakes. The technical bias of irrigation interventions needs to be recognised
but not necessarily diminished.  The emphasis is on sensitive, apt and iterative engineering.
Most irrigation improvement programmes in Tanzania currently favour upstream abstraction
over downstream compensation.  Yet, using sensible design protocols, engineering can do much
to share water between both the irrigation intake and the river from which it abstracts.   
Technical biases - within-system improvements.  Likewise, within irrigation systems, design
can be used to improve water management and not necessarily by ‘lining canals’.  For example,
a cellular approach to tertiary water distribution can tell farmers where in the ‘farmer cell’
water is being overused and by whom.  Interestingly, hierarchical networks combined with
strict schedules, favoured by engineers, are often subverted by farmers who prefer to operate a
constant flow.  Yet, when water is in short supply, farmers in Usangu were observed to switch
to a rotating supply.  This flexibility is an important consideration when assisting farmers with
new ideas. 
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Technical biases - formulating water demand and rights.  Engineers calculating water
demand and water rights should consider the traditional FAO method of determining water
need (which is more appropriate for situations where water supply exceeds land or exceeds total
downstream needs) as a cross-check to other methods.  The latter might consider
upstream/downstream needs, or seasonal dynamics and climate variability, or flexibility at the
intake to accommodate low and high flows.  Clearly this means determining the supply based
on different criteria, agreeable to various stakeholders.
Conclusion
A rural livelihoods approach to irrigation is formulated as:
a) An approach that recognises the many dimensions and complexities of irrigation arising
from its role as a sector, input, system and activity.
b) The understanding that farmers are integrating across a wide range of constraints, costs,
benefits and risks when deciding whether to develop, expand irrigation or improve it.
c) An argument that says farmers rather than officials are better placed to decide on how
irrigation can be improved or potential be realised.
d) A river basin approach that recognises the subtractability of water resources due to
irrigation, and therefore the balance between upstream irrigation livelihoods and
downstream environmental and livelihood needs.
e) A recognition that conflict mediation at different irrigation-river basin scales may be as
important as promoting irrigation.  
f) A recognition of the site, stage and context elements of irrigation so that ‘problems’ of
irrigation are addressed using a cognitive, problem-solving approach, rather than the
hurried application of theory informed by ‘normal’ viewpoints of agencies.
g) An acknowledgement of the strong technical nature of irrigation (often underplayed in
rural livelihood frameworks) – yet counterbalanced against the social side of irrigation
and guarding against the tendency for design to be inappropriate.
h) Recognition that farmers are interested in irrigation because of a number of benefits:
income generation; food; food security and jobs.  The links between these farmer-level
benefits and national poverty, food security and unemployment strategies are not direct;
suggesting the latter three are by-products of farmer interests.
i) A recognition that the surrounding economic and cultural environment stimulates
irrigation activity and the desire to resolve water-based conflicts  (land tenure, markets,
crop pricing, etc)
j) The provision, where necessary, of services and infrastructure to facilitate access to
very small amounts of water and/or irrigated land for the poor.
k) The provision, where necessary, of the capital for major works beyond the reach of
poor farmers.
l) That, within the debate over national food security, a distinction is made between
strategies for private-sector involvement, and those required to support pro-poor
livelihoods.
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In summary, this paper has strong parallels with arguments by Guijt and Thompson (1994) who
examined small-scale irrigation, from which these quotes are taken:
“An environmental and socio-economic analysis of irrigated agriculture challenges
us to come to terms with the complexity of local livelihood strategies in diverse and
risk-prone environments”. (p. 295)
“Assumptions made by engineers and planners about social and economic realities
and about the likely performance of systems reflect a limited perspective on
landscapes and livelihoods which is often at odds with local realities” (p. 307)
“Irrigated agriculture is almost always only part of rural people’s livelihood
strategies” (p. 307)
“Their livelihoods are strongly affected by macro-level economic and political
processes, such as structural adjustment and land reform policies” (p. 308)
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